Eastman Kodak, the photography pioneer which invented the digital camera, emerged from Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection Tuesday, with plans to continue as a smaller digital imaging company.
The new Kodak will focus on commercial products such as high-speed digital printing technology and printing on flexible packaging for consumer goods.
"You can't imagine how much I have been waiting for this moment ... This is a totally new company," Chief Executive Officer Antonio Perez told reporters.
Kodak, founded in 1880 by George Eastman, was for years synonymous with household cameras and family snapshots. It filed a $6.75 billion bankruptcy in January 2012, weighed down by high pension costs and a years-long delay in embracing digital camera technology.
The new company expects to have $2.5 billion in revenue this year, Perez said.
Kodak once employed more than 60,000 people and was one of the largest employers in Rochester, N.Y., where it is based. Perez told reporters his most difficult task at the helm of the bankrupt company was dealing with hefty pension costs.
"I would not recommend anyone to file for Chapter 11, but if you have to deal with legacy costs, in my opinion, that's the only way you can do it," Perez said.
The company in April resolved a crucial dispute with its British pension fund, which dropped a $2.8 billion claim against Kodak. The fund also bought the company's personalized imaging and document imaging businesses, to be named Kodak Alaris, for $650 million.
The company said it has repaid its debtor-in-possession lenders and will receive about $406 million in new financing.
Perez, in charge since 2005, had been trying to steer the company towards consumer and commercial printers but was unable to stem the cash drain. The company hasn't posted an annual profit since 2007.
Chief executives are commonly ousted through the bankruptcy process, but Perez remains top boss at Kodak, a result he attributed to his ability to do "what I needed to do" during the restructuring.
"When I came here, the previous board ... gave me three tasks - restructure the film business, create a completely new company that would have a future, and ... eliminate or settle the very large legacy costs that we had from the old company," Perez said.
Kodak had hoped to fetch more than $2 billion through its bankruptcy process for about 1,100 patents related to digital imaging, but drew only $525 million for the portfolio, which experts said was a crucial reason it had to sell core businesses and reinvent itself.
"We're not the largest competitor in the market, but we're offering the biggest differentiation in the market," Perez said.
Nine Great American Companies That Will Never Recover
Fresh From Bankruptcy, Kodak to Focus on Commercial Printing
Today's Bank of America (BAC) was created through a series of mega-mergers and acquisitions engineered by CEO Ken Lewis, including the purchases of FleetBoston in 2003 and credit card giant MBNA in 2005. By 2007, he had succeeded in making Bank of America the largest bank in the U.S. by deposits. But then Lewis overreached. As the financial system was heading toward near-collapse in 2008, Bank of America bought crippled mortgage bank Countrywide Financial in January and deeply troubled investment bank Merrill Lynch in September.
After that, Bank of America's financial troubles multiplied so rapidly that it was forced to take much more TARP money than most other large U.S. banks: $45 billion.
Lewis was replaced by Brian Moynihan, but Moynihan's tenure has been even worse. JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) passed BofA to become the nation's largest bank. Crippling losses, primarily from Countrywide legacy loans, led it to announce it would cut more than 30,000 jobs. In late 2011, a $50 billion class action suit was filed in over the Merrill Lynch acquisition.
Bank of America was also the target of several mortgage fraud suits, and entered into a settlement which cost it and four other large U.S. banks a combined $25 billion. BofA still faces legal and balance sheet problems, which may force it to raise tens of billions of dollars. And finally, its exposure to the weak U.S. real estate market is unparalleled among banks. The overall result is a too-big-to-fail bank that is only limping along.
You may be surprised to see Zynga (ZNGA), the premier social gaming company, on our list. Its revenue rose from $19.4 million in 2008 to $1.14 billion last year. But Zynga spent plenty of money to reach the apex of its industry, and last year lost $404 million. Investors were drawn to the company because it had been effectively piggy-backing games onto the Facebook platform, which currently has nearly 1 billion members.
The success of the model appeared astonishing. In its last reported quarter, Zynga says it had 192 million monthly unique users, up 27% from the same quarter a year before. But Zynga lost $23 million last quarter on revenue of $332 million. In the same quarter a year ago, Zynga made $1 million on revenue of $279 million.
Zynga's growth rate is no longer impressive, and the problems it faces apparently will worsen soon. The company recently lowered its outlook to reflect delays in launching new games and a faster decline in the use of existing Web games.
But Zynga's real problems are more complex - and more permanent -- than delays and declining use. The game market is becoming more fragmented by the day, and as the total number of virtual games has grown, the cost for Zynga to maintain its lead has become almost prohibitive.
Dell (DELL), along with Hewlett-Packard (HPQ), Compaq, and Gateway, was one of the companies that capitalized on the creation of the generic IBM PC platform. But the environment in which it grew rapidly by selling inexpensive PCs has changed radically.
First, Dell's computer sales business was damaged by poor management decisions and the rise of Asian manufacturers, which took significant market share from the company. Now, it's being hammered by the smartphone and tablet PC sectors.
All PC makers -- Asian and American -- face substantial pricing challenges today. And as computing has moved quickly to mobile devices, demand for computers has fallen. Dell didn't adapt, didn't diversify the way IBM did, and its reliance on PC sales has left it heading toward irrelevance.
The New York Times Co. (NYT) has long been the premier daily newspaper company in the U.S., but it has been shrinking rapidly. Ten years ago, it made $300 million on revenue of $3.1 billion. Last year, it lost $40 million on revenue of $2.3 billion.
The New York Times' key failure was that it didn't move online fast enough to compensate for the rapid erosion of print advertising -- tardiness that allowed it to be challenged on the Web by properties like The Huffington Post, Google News, MSN, AOL and Yahoo.
Right now, its market cap is $1.2 billion against its revenue of $2.3 billion in 2011. Compare that to low-brow content aggregator Demand Media, which has a market capitalization of $865 million against 2011 revenue of $325 million. Demand lost $13 million last year. The reason the market values of the two companies are so close? The Times still relies on the dying print business for the lion's share of its revenue, and it's in no finiancial position to make a more aggressive move to the Internet or buy large online properties.
The New York Times' uniqueness among American newspapers is the quality of its editorial content, and it has for the most part retained its large editorial staff. (It did lay off 100 people in 2009, which was about 8% of the newsroom). But The Times has not been able to show significant top-line growth, even with its intensive digital subscription efforts. Quite simply, print is in too much of a shambles for the company to shore itself up in the digital world.
The cause of Barnes & Noble's (BKS) downfall can be described in one word: Amazon. In 2002, Barnes & Noble made $109 million on sales of $4.9 billion. That same year, Amazon lost $149 million on revenue of $3.9 billion. Fast forward to 2011, when Amazon's revenue reached $48.1 billion and it earned $631 million, while Barnes & Noble lost $69 million on $7.1 billion. Amazon may have expanded into other product lines, but at its heart it is still the world's largest bookstore, and the Kindle Fire is its bestselling item.
Barnes & Noble's legacy business is huge and expensive. As of its April proxy filing, the company operated 1,338 bookstores in 50 states, including 647 bookstores on college campuses -- with all the overhead those entail.
In its last fiscal year, Barnes & Noble had retail sales of just $4.86 billion. That part of the company's business shrank by 2%. Its Nook segment, which encompasses the digital business, had revenue of only $933 million. Digital sales rose 34% over the previous year, but remain a modest portion of sales. And Barnes & Noble's digital division is vulnerable. Its Nook accounts for only 27% of U.S. market share, compared to a 60% share for the Kindle.
Sprint (S) finally posted some reasonably good results recently. However, these could not mask the fact that the No. 3 wireless carrier is too small to ever really compete with AT&T (T) and Verizon Wireless.
Sprint's $35 billion Nextel purchase in 2004 can be seen in retrospect as a key blunder. Their networks ran on different platforms, and integration issues drove customers away from the combined company. Sprint made the MSN "Customer Service Hall of Shame" several times, most recently in 2010. Its customer service has improved significantly since then, but the damage had been done.
Sprint's revenue has fallen from $41.1 billion in 2007 to $33.7 billion last year. It now has about 50 million subscribers to Verizon's 104 million and AT&T's 95 million. As a Morningstar researcher recently noted, "While Sprint has struggled, Verizon Wireless and AT&T have benefited at its expense. Fending off these much larger rivals will be increasingly difficult as data services become more important to the industry."
Young Groupon (GRPN) seems an unlikely candidate for a list of companies that have their best years behind them. But its stock price has fallen by more than 70% since its November 2011 IPO. Groupon's primary problem is that the online coupon business it pioneered is a commodity business now. Amazon and other large retailers have had little trouble entering the sector.
Groupon soared upward: In 2009, it posted revenues of only $15 million, but by 2011 revenues were over $1.6 billion. But Groupon paid dearly for that growth. The company lost $675 million over that same two-year period before interest and taxes. Groupon's revenue keeps growing, but its bottom line losses are growing too: In the most recent quarter it lost $147 million, far worse than its loss of $12 million a year earlier.
Groupon's new competitors have replicated most of its tactics rapidly. Chief rival LivingSocial had 7.2 million unique visitors last year to Groupon's 11 million, according to online industry research firm Comscore. Google has entered the sector with a product called Google Offers. And those are just the big names: Industry website VentureBeat lists 33 direct competitors to Groupon.
AMD (AMD) was Intel's (INTC) primary competitor five years ago, but its latest quarterly report shows just how far it has fallen. Year-over-year revenue dropped 10% to $1.4 billion. In 2007, it held about 24% of the server and PC chip market. Last year, its market share was just 19%. And then, there's AMD's single greatest problem: In 2006, it bought graphic chip maker ATI for $5.4 billion. At the time, the move made sense: PC makers were using more of ATI's chips in their machines, and AMD needed to keep pace with Intel and graphic chip maker Nvidia. (NVDA)
But the purchase did almost nothing to help AMD's fortunes; its main result was that it saddled AMD with unsustainable debt. In 2007, AMD had revenue of $6 billion, while Intel's was $38.3 billion. Last year, AMD's revenue had risen to $6.6 billion, while Intel's had soared to $54 billion.
AMD has had three CEOs in the last five years as it struggled to find a strategy for growth. The company's greatest challenge may lie ahead as much of the personal computing market moves to tablets and smartphones, where Samsung, Qualcomm (QCOM) and ARM Holdings (ARMH) dominate, and AMD's products are almost nowhere to be found.
J.C. Penney (JCP), founded in 1913, counted itself among the top retailers and catalog companies in the U.S. for decades. But under CEO Myron Ullman III, who took over in 2004, its revenue began to slide, dropping from $19.9 billion in 2007 to $17.3 billion in 2011. Over the same period, earnings fell from $1.1 billion to a loss of $152 million.
J.C. Penney's share price has fallen 70% in five years. By way of contrast, shares of Macy's (M) and Target (TGT) have been essentially flat over the same period. Penney's lost ground to these two companies and several others, including Walmart (WMT) and Costco (COST). Eventually, the problems became so pronounced that it closed its formerly successful catalog business and reached outside for a new CEO. The board's choice was Apple retail chief Ron Johnson, who came in with a mandate and a plan to revamp the company. However, his big move to eliminate most sale events and change the company's pricing structure drew a poor reaction from shoppers: Revenue dropped an extraordinary 20.1% to $3.2 billion in the first fiscal quarter, and J.C. Penney posted a loss of $163 million. And internet sales fell 27.9% to $271 million.
Again, by way of comparison, Macy's overall sales rose 4.3% to $6.1 billion in the last reported quarter. And Macy's is hardly J.C. Penney's largest competitor by revenue or workforce. Walmart's sales were $450 billion last year, while Costco's were $89 billion.